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Abstract
This paper examines a framework in which politicians can decrease unemployment
via active labor market policies (ALMP). We combine theoretical models on partisan
and opportunistic cycles and assume that voters are ignorant of the necessary facts to
make informed voting decisions. The model predicts that politicians have incentives
for a strategic use of active labor market policies that leads to a political cycle in un-
employment and budget deficit. We test the hypotheses predicted by the theoretical
model using data from German states from 1985:1 to 2004:11. The results illustrate
that opportunistic behavior of politicians can explain the development of ALMP ap-
proximated by job-creation schemes.
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1 Introduction and related literature
This paper introduces a theoretical model that combines aspects of political business cycle
theory (PBC) and partisan cycle theory (PT) with the empirical findings that voters do not
decide as rationally as often assumed in literature. In our model, politicians face a trade-off
between the budget deficit and unemployment, whereas the latter can be fought via active
labor market policies (ALMP). The model predicts that opportunistic and partisan motiva-
tion of incumbents can explain cycles in ALMP and governmental deficit. Furthermore, we
provide empirical evidence from the former West German states during the period 1985:1 to
2004:11 and find that active labor market policies were indeed driven by electoral cycles.
Traditional PBC theory concentrates on politicians facing a short-run Phillips curve
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. In such a political setting, as initially devel-
oped by Nordhaus (1975) and enhanced by Persson and Tabellini (1990), Rogoff (1990), or
Shi and Svensson (2006), political business cycles occur due to incumbents fighting unem-
ployment in election years via politically determined positive aggregate demand shocks in
order to become re-elected.
Politicians may also have certain ideological beliefs which shape their policies, or they
may follow party ideologies. Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987) argue that leftist parties
attach more importance to unemployment than inflation, while rightwing parties do the
exact opposite.
There have been some attempts to combine both bodies of literature, as politicians
may plausibly be motivated by both opportunistic and partisan considerations. Frey and
Schneider (1978a, 1978b) argue that an incumbent has strong incentives to take opinion polls
into account: at times when he is popular, he may implement his favorite partisan politics,
whereas he may focus on opportunistic behavior to increase his re-election chances once
opinion polls turn sufficiently unfavorable for him. In a recent paper, Sieg (2006) combines
rational partisan and opportunistic theory. His model predicts an opportunistic political
business cycle with a signalling game in the run-up to an election and a partisan cycle that
depends on the winners’ partisan orientation.
During the last decades, literature has uniformly assumed voters to decide in a rational
way. We argue that this is unrealistic: empirical evidence suggests that voters are often
ignorant of the necessary facts to make informed voting decisions.1Downs (1957) introduced
the theory of rational ignorance as an explanation for the fact that voters often do not
know a great deal about relevant topics. When considering a large number of voters, the
probability that a particular voter will be the swing-voter is nearly zero. Having the choice
between different candidates, voters must be aware of their respective manifestos and many
1For example, half of Americans do not know that their state sends two senators to Washington, D.C.
(Caplan 2007, p. 8). Another impressive example is the answer to the question: “What are the two largest
areas of federal government spending?” in America. The most frequently mentioned answer was foreign aid
- which is in fact one of the smallest budget components (Caplan 2007, p. 79).
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other criteria such as credibility or institutional framework, in order to identify the monetary
consequences of each candidate being elected. Information gathering is costly, as voters may
need to watch the news, read newspapers, perhaps buy economics textbooks (to realize the
trade-off between unemployment and budget deficit, for example) or consult with experts.
It follows that their information costs almost certainly exceed their expected gain in utility
from choosing the right candidate. Hence, voters do not have any incentives for information
gathering in order to vote rationally in the traditional sense. In a similar vein, Caplan (2001,
2003, 2007) and Caplan and Cowen (2004) argue that voters may be biased in some way and
propose to call the voters’ actions rational irrational voting. Plausible reasons for assuming
voters to be biased can be found in the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy
(Washington Post et al., 1996), which clearly states that voters look at economic problems
in a fundamentally different way than economists.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the theoretical model. First,
we develop a simple framework for analyzing parties’ optimization problem. Afterwards, we
show that due to the different degrees of importance parties attach to unemployment and
budget deficit, a cycle will occur. In section 3, empirical evidence from German states is
provided. Section 4 concludes the analysis.
2 The Model
2.1 General setting
We assume an economy consisting of an incumbent i, an opponent o, and a fixed number
of voters. The incumbent decides on the government’s expenditures in every period t and
elections take place in every second period. We assume that the governmental budget is
balanced if no active labor market policy is implemented as we want to point out the impor-
tance of ALMP. This means that every Euro that is additionally spent for ALMP increases
the budget deficit bt ceteris paribus. Without any spending on active labor market policy,
bt = 0 holds.
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The economy’s unemployment rate ut in period t depends on the natural rate of un-
employment un and the amount of active labor market policy expenditures. For analytical
simplicity and theoretical clarity, we disregard all other determinants of unemployment, such
as overall macroeconomic performance or structural reforms, in order to outline the effects
of ALMP and can hence write the unemployment rate in period t as a function of un and bt:
ut = u
n − β · bt (1)
with β > 0.3 Intuitively, the government has the opportunity to decrease the unemployment
rate in every period t via ALMP. The underlying mechanism is simple: the government
2Concerning the interpretation of the results that we are about to derive, one should interpret bt as the
share of budget deficit over GDP.
3For simplicity, we assume β to be exogenous in the sense that politicians are not able to optimize over
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engages in job-creation schemes. On the one hand, the implementation of ALMP increases,
ceteris paribus, the budget deficit as ALMP incurs costs and usually does not generate
additional revenues.4 On the other hand, unemployment falls, so that the government faces
a clear trade-off between a small governmental deficit and low unemployment.5
An example of the empirical relevance of this mechanism is Germany, where local and
federal governments as well as the Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit)
have the opportunity to introduce job-creation measures (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen),
structural adjustment measures (Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen), or vocational retraining.
Those measures are obviously not free of charge: in Germany, for example, the average
monthly cost of a job-creation measure was about 1511 Euro in 2003 (Caliendo and Steiner,
2005). Figure 1 shows that many OECD countries (particularly European ones) face ALMP
expenditures close to one percent of GDP (OECD, 2007, p. 231), which represents a con-
siderable fraction of freely disposable government expenditure.
Figure 1 about here
Official German unemployment statistics do not include people engaged in ALMP mea-
sures (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit, 2004). Hence German politicians face exactly the same
trade-off as stated in our model.
To decide whether to fully inform oneself about political and economic relationships or
not, each voter compares his expected gain in utility from selecting the right candidate
with the costs of gathering information. Whenever these costs outweigh the expected gain
in utility, a voter does not engage in collecting information at all. Each voter’s expected
net gain in utility (NGU) from choosing the right candidate in an election involving two
candidates can be stated as
NGU = ρ · [payoffright − payoffwrong]− information costs,
where payoffk is the present value of the payoff resulting from candidate k’s, k = right,wrong,
future policies, e.g. tax reforms or similar things. ρ is the probability of each voter being the
swing voter. One can easily see that the expected gain in utility from supporting the right
candidate will be extremely low in an economy with a reasonable large number of voters,
β. In reality, one could interpret β as a policy variable in the sense of politicians’ ability to create new
and heterogenous ALMP measures at a lower price. This would mean an increase in β: The decrease in
unemployment is higher for a given amount of bt. An example of a politically induced increase in β could be
the 1-Euro jobs in Germany, which allow politicians to decrease unemployment whilst paying a lower price,
measured as the variation in budget deficit.
4Even if a job-creation measure generated additional revenues, these would certainly not exceed the
expenditure required to create the measure. Hence, bt increases.
5Note, however, that ALMP in period t does not influence the unemployment rate or the budget deficit
in future periods. Hence, we assume that there are no positive effects on future regular employment due to
ALMP. For example, empirical evidence for the ineffectiveness of ALMP is provided by Hagen and Steiner
(2000) for Germany and by Lalive, van Ours and Zweimu¨ller (2008) as well as Gerfin and Lechner (2002)
for Switzerland.
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even if both parties differ greatly in their fiscal consequences. Therefore, it is extremely
unlikely that the net gain in utility is positive. Hence, rational voters have no incentive to
inform themselves about political as well as economic relationships.6
Although voters have no incentives to actively look for information, we assume that they
somehow become informed about the economic performance.7 We choose the unemployment
rate as a proxy for the economic performance as unemployment is a major concern in almost
every industrialized country. In the overwhelming majority of pre-election surveys voters
report unemployment as the greatest problem in their society.8
Furthermore, as recent research shows, the self-interested voter hypothesis fails in empir-
ical tests.9 Hence, our assumption of voters looking implicitly at a macro variable such as
unemployment is similar to what is called sociotropic voting. In our model, voters are not
concerned with the consequences for their own wallets, but actually vote for politicians who
they suppose to be good for the country.
Formally, we assume the voting behavior of each voter to depend on the current unem-
ployment rate ut and a random variable µt that is distributed in the interval [−z; +z] and
E(µ) = 0. µt can be interpreted as voters or informational bias (see Caplan and Cowen,
2004, for a discussion) as well as the expressive voting hypothesis established by Brennan
and Lomasky (1993). Within the model, µt basically ensures that incumbents are not able to
guarantee their re-election. We assume that voters are identical. Therefore, the probability
of an incumbent of party i being re-elected can thus be written as
p = p(ut(bt), µt). (2)
We assume that p is distributed in the interval (0, 1) with ∂p
∂ut
< 0 (and hence ∂p
∂bt
> 0),
but that the incumbent is not able to set a sufficiently low unemployment rate to make his
re-election a certain event.10 The structure of the voting probability implicitly assumes that
voters have a short memory. Case studies concerning very volatile popularity data for the
leading politicians support this assumption (see, for example, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen,
2008). Note, however, that the voting probability can be written as in (2) because rational
voters do not have an incentive to inform themselves about political and economic relation-
ships or mechanisms. Although they are unaware of economic mechanisms and interrelations,
6For discussion on the topic see Downs (1957), Caplan (2001, 2003, 2007), as well as Jones and Dawson
(2008).
7This is in line with e.g. Downs (1957). It would be inappropriate to assume that voters do not receive any
information about the economic performance at all. Imagine voters watching TV or passing a newsstand in
the street - they certainly get some kind of information about their country’s economic performance despite
not actively searching for information.
8According to infratest dimap (2005), 88 percent of the voters mentioned “unemployment” when asked
what (in their opinion) the most important political problems were on the day of the German Bundestagswahl
in 2005. Although multiple answers were possible, only 5 percent mentioned “public debt”.
9See Caplan, 2002 for a discussion of this topic.
10Especially, he does not know µt when deciding on bt.
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they have some knowledge about macroeconomic performance, here measured by unemploy-
ment. Therefore, our analysis differs from other recent models on political or partisan cycles
in assuming that voters do not actively search for information and may be biased in some
way.
Politicians maximize their expected utility, which consists of two elements. On the one
hand, an ideologically motivated outcome component including unemployment and budget
deficits. On the other hand, an ego rent r > 0 is generated by holding office. This means
that we combine two essential elements of political business cycle literature: as stated by
Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990), the political optimization
problem has an opportunistic component insofar as politicians prefer to be in office rather
than not. However, following Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987), politicians also face a trade-
off between two bads.
In our model, elections take place in every second period. Therefore, the timing of the
two period model is as follows: at the beginning of period t, the incumbent sets his favored
unemployment rate using ALMP. Afterwards, voters decide who they want in office for the
next two periods: either the incumbent i who is a member of the left (L) or the right (R)
party, or the opponent who is a member of the other party. In t+1, the winner implements
his favorite policy.
The expected utility of incumbent i can therefore be written as
E(V i) = θi ·
{
−αi(uit)
2 − (bit)
2
}
+ (1− θi)rit
+ p(ut(bt), µt) · δ
i ·
[
θi ·
{
−αi(uit+1)
2 − (bit+1)
2
}
+ (1− θi)rit+1
]
+ (1− p(ut(bt), µt)) · δ
i ·
[
θi
{
−αi(uot+1)
2 − (bot+1)
2
}]
,
(3)
where δi denotes the discount rate which we assume to be the same for all candidates of
party L, respectively R. rit is the candidate’s ego rent from holding office. u
o
t+1 and b
o
t+1
(uit+1 and b
i
t+1) denote the values of unemployment and the budget deficit in period t + 1
that would result if the opponent (incumbent) won the election. Incumbent i’s relative
preference of ut to bt is measured by α
i. θi is an exogenous parameter that measures the
importance of ideologic goals relative to the ego rent rit.
11 Over time, however, θi may
differ between different incumbents of the same party. The politicians’ utility decreases with
unemployment and the budget deficit at an increasing rate (∂
2E(V i)
∂u2
t
< 0 and ∂
2E(V i)
∂b2
t
< 0).
The latter implicates the existence of something such as an implicit intertemporal budget
constraint.12
11One could also imagine θi to be endogenous, depending on election polls for example, which would be
an application of the idea developed by Frey and Schneider (1978).
12This means that politicians are not only aware of the trade-off between unemployment and budget
deficit, but also of the necessity of future budget balancing. We argue that if a restriction like the need
of an intertemporal budget balance exists, huge amounts of budget surpluses in a certain period are as
problematic as a deficit with respect to the target achievement. However, our results remain unchanged
when the quadratic terms in (3) are substituted by linear terms.
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The two parties have preferences concerning the unemployment rate and the budget
deficit. The borderline case αL = αR could be interpreted as a purely opportunistic version
of our model. We assume αL > αR to hold.13 For a given budget deficit, an incumbent
of the leftist party dislikes unemployment more than a rightwing incumbent does. For
simplicity and analytical convenience, we suppose rLt = r
R
t = r
L
t+1 = r
R
t+1 = r to hold, which
seems plausible as, for example, salary payments to the incumbent do not depend on the
incumbent’s partisan orientation.
2.2 Non-election periods
To solve the model, we first consider what happens in the non-election period t+1. As there
are no elections, politicians can neglect their influence on p because there simply is none.
Therefore, the incumbent i will maximize his period t+1 utility, taking all future decisions
as exogenously given and taking the trade-off between unemployment and budget deficit (1)
into account.
We can rewrite the incumbent’s maximization problem as
max
bt+1
θi ·
{
−αiu2t+1 − (bt+1)
2
}
+ (1− θi)r s.t. ut+1 = u
n − β · bt+1.
Using the first order condition, the optimal budget deficit in the non-election period t + 1
for incumbent i turns out to be
bi∗t+1 =
αiβun
1 + αiβ2
. (4)
We can easily see that
∂bi∗
t+1
∂un
> 0 holds: the optimal budget deficit for an incumbent of
type i increases with the natural rate of unemployment. Note that bi∗t+1 does not depend
on θi because no elections take place and, therefore, there is no need to weigh the ideologic
against the opportunistic goal.
The optimal budget deficit in t+ 1 varies positively with αi:
∂bi∗t+1
∂αi
=
βun
(1 + αiβ2)2
> 0
since we assumed β > 0. Hence, assuming αr < αl, we can conclude that the optimal budget
deficit in a non-election period is higher if the leftist party is the incumbent.
Using (4), we can determine ui∗t+1:
ui∗t+1 = u
n −
αiβ2un
1 + αiβ2
(5)
13It is common practice in PBC literature to assume the leftwing party to be more in favor of low unem-
ployment than the rightwing one. For brief discussions, see Hibbs (1977) and Alesina et. al (1997).
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where
∂ui∗
t+1
∂αi
< 0 holds, which means that the optimal period t+ 1 unemployment rate from
the incumbent’s point of view is lower for the leftwing party. However, ui∗t+1 also does not
depend on θi.
The analysis above clearly shows that in our model there will be political determined
differences in b and u in all periods without an election. Whenever a leftist politician is in
power, unemployment will be lower at the expense of a higher budget deficit. Therefore, in
non-election periods there will be fluctuations in ALMP and unemployment, depending on
the incumbent’s partisan orientation.
2.3 Election periods
Given the politicians’ non election year strategies described in (4), we can calculate their
policy choices in election periods using (3). Incumbent i’s optimization problem is
max
bt
E(V i) =θi ·
{
−αi(un − βbt)
2 − b2t
}
+ (1− θi)r
+ p(ut(bt), µt) · δ ·
[
θi ·
{
−αi ·
(
un − βbi∗t+1
)2
−
(
bi∗t+1
)2}
+ (1− θi)r
]
+ (1− p(ut(bt), µt)) · δ ·
[
θi ·
{
−αi ·
(
un − βbo∗t+1
)2
−
(
bo∗t+1
)2}]
,
(6)
where o is the candidate of the other party.
Using the respective first order condition as well as (4), the incumbent i’s optimal budget
deficit in t amounts to
bi∗t =
αiβun
1 + αiβ2
+
∂p
∂ut
∂ut
∂bt
·
δ
2(1 + αiβ2)
·
[
−αi
(
un −
αiβ2un
1 + αiβ2
)2
−
(
αiβun
1 + αiβ2
)2
+
(1− θi)r
θi
]
−
∂p
∂ut
∂ut
∂bt
·
δ
2(1 + αiβ2)
·
[
−αi
(
un −
αoβ2un
1 + αoβ2
)2
−
(
αoβun
1 + αoβ2
)2]
.
(7)
In order to determine whether there will be an opportunistic cycle component, we com-
pare bt with bt+1. As the first term of (7) equals incumbent i’s optimal budget deficit in
t+ 1, we have to take a look at the second and third term of (7). For completely identical
politicians, which means αR = αL, we can clearly see that the budget deficit in an election
period is higher than in a period without election. This is not altogether surprising as we
assumed r > 0, which implies that every politician prefers staying in office, although the
political outcome is the same for both types of incumbents.
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Under more general conditions than in the last paragraph, bt > bt+1 holds whenever
− αi ·
(
un −
αiβ2un
1 + αiβ2
)2
−
(
αiβun
1 + αiβ2
)2
+
(1− θi)r
θi
>
− αi ·
(
un −
αoβ2un
1 + αoβ
)2
−
(
αoβun
1 + αoβ2
)2 (8)
is fulfilled.
Proposition: bi∗t > b
i∗
t+1 holds for all i = L,R as long as r ≥ 0.
Proof: Using (8) and rearranging terms yields:
r > −
β2(un)2(αi − αo)2
(1 + αiβ2)(1 + αoβ2)2
θi
(1− θi)
< 0. (9)
Hence, we conclude that ALMP expenditures in election years exceed ALMP in non-election
years even if we assumed that there was no ego rent from holding office because there is an
ideological benefit from holding office.14 For a positive r, bt would even be higher, the higher
r is. 
As incumbents seek re-election, they always face an incentive to lower unemployment
figures in election periods as long as r ≥ 0, which leads to an increase of the budget deficit.
There is only one imaginable situation where bt > bt+1 does not hold. This is the case for
identical politicians (αL = αR) who do not benefit from being incumbent (r = 0), which
does not seem to be realistic at all.
Hence, using (7) and (1), we can conclude that ui∗t < u
i∗
t+1 holds for i = L,R as the
election period budget deficit exceeds the budget deficit in a non-election period for both
types of parties.
Finally, we can determine the effect of a change in θi on bi∗t and u
i∗
t . Differentiation of
(7) with respect to θi obtains
∂bi∗t
∂θi∗
= −
∂p
∂ut
∂ut
∂bt
δr
1 + αiβ2
[
1− θi
2θi2
+
1
2θi
]
< 0.
If the relative importance the incumbent i attaches to his partisan goals increases, the budget
deficit in t decreases because the re-election goal loses importance. Therefore,
∂ui∗
t
∂θi∗
> 0 holds.
Hence, in our model a political business cycle occurs due to systematic deviations in
active labor market policies which depend on the incumbent’s partisan orientation and on
the timing of the election. A crucial assumption is the voters’ behavior. For them, it
is fully rational not to gather any information about political and economic backgrounds
and interrelations. However, they do receive some information about the macroeconomic
performance. If voters were rational in the traditional sense, politicians would not necessarily
14Note that (9) reveals that even for a negative r (e.g. being interpreted as a burden of responsibility),
bi∗
t
> bi∗
t+1 may hold whenever politicians differ in their ideological beliefs.
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be able to gain from expanding the public deficit in election periods as the fully informed
voters would be aware of the underlying trade-off between unemployment and public debt.
Yet empirical evidence suggests that people are not fully rational, and therefore our portrait
seems to be appropriate.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Institutional background
3.1.1 Active labor market policies in Germany
The so-called active labor market policy is concerned with reintegration of unemployed
persons into the labor market by, for example, subsidising wages or by means of job creation
schemes.15 These ALMP programs, in Germany supervised by the Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, FEA) are intended to help overcome the unemployment
problem. Historically, the ALMP programs were one of the most important innovations of
the Job Promotion Act (AFG, Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz), which formed the legal basis for
labor market policies in Germany in the period 1969 to 1997. In 1998, the Social Code
(Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB) III was adopted and it was intended that ALMP should become
further intensified.
ALMP does not only play a role at the federal level, however.16 In practice, it is not
only the FEA that implements ALMP, but above all, the Laender Employment Agencies
(Landesanstalten, LEA) as Germany is a federal state (for further details on labor market
policies in Germany and the institutional set-up of job creation schemes see e.g. Thomsen,
2007, p. 16).
In fact, the states’ governments can implement their preferred labor market policies not
only by subsidizing particular ALMPs with money from their own budgets, but also by
setting administrative guidelines within the LEAs. There is an intense interaction, or even
sleaze between the political decision makers and leading civil servants in the LEAs.17 Besides
the programmes initiated by the LEAs and the local agencies, each state government can
15There are several ALMP instruments which broadly remained the same but were extended over time.
Thomsen (2007) refers to the SGB III as a legal basis and distinguishes between “Measures to Enhance
and Adjust the Qualification of the Individuals”, “Counselling and Assistance for Regional and Vocational
Mobility” and “Subsidised Employment”. The latter category consists of wage subsidies and two groups of
employment programs, namely job creation schemes and structural adjustment schemes. They both establish
the so-called second labor market.
16Some anecdotic evidence concerning the relevance of job-creation schemes in the run-up to an election
can be found in the elections for the Bundestag in 1994 and 1998. The then-chancellor Helmut Kohl used
ALMP measures to fight unemployment to a notable extent.
17Note that local authorities also play an important role in ALMP because they arrange new jobs, find
positions for unemployed persons and locally negotiate with the so called “Traeger”, but they are not
responsible for the budget decisions.
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implement additional ALMP measures. Therefore, the trade-off between unemployment and
budget deficit applied in our theoretical model directly appears in reality: for any given level
of local or LEA activity, a States’ government can implement additional ALMP measures.
At the beginning of the 1980s, some German states first introduced their own programs
on employment promotion18, such as a special program of the senate in Hamburg in October
1982.19 Throughout the period of the European structural fund of 1988, ALMP programs
and activities of the German states generally increased. However, activities and intensity
varied between the states. For example, the Saarland heavily relied on ALMP programs
in their labor market policies. Even today, the state’s government explicitly highlights its
activities with respect to ALMP.
Another example for the role of government in ALMP measures is the state North Rhine-
Westphalia. After the Rhine flood at the beginning of 1995, unemployed persons were
assigned to job-creation schemes to assist in the flood plain and thus no longer appeared
in official unemployment statistics. Thus after the flood, unemployment had also declined,
just in time for the 1995 election of the state parliament. Another recent example is Hesse
in 2008. As a precondition to joining a coalition with Social Democrats and Greens, the
socialist party “Die Linke” demanded job-creation schemes for 25.000 people.20
However, ALMP programs already started in the beginning of the 1980s in the former
western states, so our analysis will focus on this group of 10 states. In particular, we will
examine job-creation schemes until 2004.21 On the one hand, this is due to the fact that
job-creation schemes were an prominent policy instrument and they became less important
since the end of 2004. On the other hand, job-creation schemes are the ALMP measure with
the best and most comparable data supply in Germany.
3.1.2 Parties, government coalitions, legislative periods and elections
There are two large parties in Germany, the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the
conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Bavaria, Germany’s federal state with
the largest area, the conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party,
the Christian Social Party (CSU). However, there is no party competition between them and
they form a single faction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). That is why we label both
CDU in the following empirical analysis. All federal chancellors and state prime ministers
were members of one of these two big blocks, SPD and CDU. Therefore, one can test for
partisan effects simply on this left-right dimension.
Nevertheless, the much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR)
have played an important role as coalition partners in the former Western states. While the
18For a brief overview, see Kohler (2004: p. 50).
19The program first amounted to 51 million Euro and was later enhanced, see Hombach (1984, p.190).
20http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,574355,00.html.
21We do not include later years due to structural reforms of the German labor market by the so-called
Hartz-laws, which were introduced in 2005 and would lead to some data specification problems within the
empirical analysis.
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SPD has formed coalitions with all the other three parties, the CDU never formed a coalition
with the Greens on the federal or state level during the period analyzed in this paper. We
will also consider the impacts of the different coalition types, because it is possible that the
simple leftwing-rightwing dimension may neglect ideological differences between government
parties within a ”camp” (e.g. for the Left between SPD/FDP and SPD/GR coalitions). As
minority governments and other government formations have played a negligible role, they
will be subsumed under the coalition types mentioned above. There are no fixed election
dates across the German states and the legislative periods last between four and five years.
However, early elections may be called independently. So far, less than ten percent of the
elections in the German states were early elections.
3.2 Data and empirical strategy
3.2.1 Data and variables
The data set contains monthly data for the number of job-creation schemes in the period
1985:1 to 2004:11 (levels) for the ten former West German states. These data are provided
by Germany’s Federal Employment Office. We do not include the former East German states
and also do not consider Berlin because it was divided before the German unification and
therefore the data contain structural breaks.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the change in the number of job-creation schemes and the
number of unemployed persons. The development of the job-creation schemes and unem-
ployment are subject to a seasonal pattern. Unemployment is higher in winter than in sum-
mer, whereas the cyclical pattern of the job-creation schemes is time-delayed. Furthermore,
there are differences in time and between the single states. For example, unemployment as
well as the number of job-creation schemes decreased at the end of the 1980s and reached
their minima after the German unification in 1990. Subsequently, both increased steadily in
almost every German state. Overall, we control for these effects using fixed year, monthly
and state dummies in the econometric model.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
Moreover, there are no further structural economic variables available on a monthly
basis, so that an exact scaling of the job-creation schemes and unemployment is not possible.
However, referring to annual population data in the states, the ratio of unemployed persons to
total population was, on average, about 4.1 percent, with a minimum of 1.5 and a maximum
of 8.8 percent. Regarding the relationship between the number of job-creation schemes and
the number of unemployed persons, there was, on average, approximately one job creation
scheme per 30 unemployed persons, with a minimum of one job-creation scheme per 400 and
a maximum of one per seven unemployed persons.
12
3.2.2 The empirical model
The basic econometric panel data model has the following appearance:
∆ln job-creation schemesiym =
∑
j
αj Political variableijym
+ λm + γy + ηi + uiym
(10)
with i = 1, ..., 10; j = 1, ..., 6;m = 1, ..., 12; y = 1985, ..., 2004.
The dependent variable ∆ln job-creation schemesiym denotes the growth rate in the num-
ber of job-creation schemes in every single state.22 Panel unit root tests show that this
variable is stationary. The appendix provides comments on the chosen test procedures.
Moreover, λm describes fixed monthly, γy fixed year
23, and ηi fixed state effects.
24∑
j αj Political variableijym describes the political variables on which this study focuses.
First, the variable Election(12) takes the timing of the elections into account. It takes on
the value of one in the twelve months before an election. In all other months, its values are
set at zero. Therefore, we directly control for fluctuations and the fact that there are no
fixed election dates in Germany. We will use this electoral variable as a benchmark. For
robustness checks, we also apply different codings such as ten, eight, six, and four months
before the elections.
We test the differences between leftist and rightwing governments predicted by our model
on the simple leftwing-rightwing scale using the variable “Left” and different coalition type
dummies, separately. The dummy “Left” takes on the value of one in periods when an SPD
Prime Minister was in office (excluding grand coalitions) and zero otherwise. In the alterna-
tive specification, the coalition type dummies take on the value of one when the considered
coalition type was in power and zero otherwise. We distinguish between six different coalition
types that governed in the former Western German states: CDU, CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD,
SPD/FDP, SPD/GR, and SPD. With respect to the grand coalitions, we do not distinguish
which of the two parties appointed the Prime Minister. To avoid multicollinearity between
these dummies, one of them must function as the reference category (here SPD). The esti-
mated effects of the other dummies must then be interpreted as deviations from this reference
category. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
The basic model is estimated by feasible generalized least squares in a common fixed
effects framework initially. In addition, we apply heteroskedastic and autocorrelation con-
sistent (HAC) Newey-West type (Newey and West, 1987) standard errors and variance-
covariance estimates, because the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 176-177) for serial
22We use the number of job-creation schemes instead of the inflows into job-creation schemes as the
measures vary in duration.
23Note that this also fixes specific historical events like the German unification.
24Moreover, we exclude one of the fixed effect variables, respectively, in order to avoid multicollinearity
problems.
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correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model implies the existence of
strong arbitrary serial correlation. Moreover, the number of job creation schemes is directly
related to the number of unemployed persons. Therefore, we include the lagged number of
unemployed persons in a further step as job-creation schemes are used in reaction to high
unemployment. We address the persistency and remaining seasonality of the dependent
variable and the time-delayed interaction of unemployed persons and job-creation schemes
by including a battery of lagged dependent variables and lags of the unemployed persons
variable.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 2 shows the regression results of the initial fixed (columns 1 and 2) and random
effects (columns 3 and 4) regressions with heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. We cannot reject the Hausman-Test in favor of
the random effects model. However, the regression results of the fixed and random effects
differ only slightly. Table 2 provides the coefficients and t-ratios (absolute values) for every
single equation.
Table 2 about here
In accordance with our theoretical model, politicians increased the number of job-creation
schemes in election years. The coefficient tells us that before elections in the German states,
the growth rate of the job-creation schemes increased by about 0.4 percent per month.
Thus, politicians behaved opportunistically to become re-elected. Moreover, the results do
not support the hypothesis that leftist governments implemented more active labor market
policies than rightwing governments. The coefficients do have the expected signs but are
statistically insignificant. On the one hand, this result could be interpreted as being due
to small ideological differences between the parties. Within our model, one might argue
that there was only a small difference between αL and αR, if there was one at all. On the
other hand, one might argue that politicians did not care much about political outcomes
and concentrated on staying in office. This could be seen as a reference to a small θL and
θR within our model.
Table 3 about here
Table 3 provides the regression results when a battery of lags of the dependent variable
and the number of unemployed persons is included. Columns (1) and (2) refer to regressions
in which 24 additional variables are included (lag 1-12 of the dependent variable and the
number of unemployed persons respectively). Note, that the Nickell-bias is 1/T and, thus,
it is ignorable in our case with T bigger than 200 and that the GMM-estimators are biased
for small N, so that we do not apply them in the current framework with N=10. Columns
(3) and (4) refer to regressions in which we have excluded the statistically insignificant lags.
The lagged dependent variable is statistically highly significant and the coefficient reveals
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an elasticity of about 0.4. The impact of the four months lagged number of unemployment
persons is statistically significant on a 10 percent level and the coefficient reveals that when
the lagged number of unemployed persons increased by one percent, the number of job-
creation schemes increased by approximately 0.04 percent. In any case, the inclusion of
the lagged dependent variables and the lagged number of unemployed persons does not
affect our inferences regarding the political variables at all. Again, the estimation results
provide evidence for an electoral cycle. The point estimate of the Election(12) only slightly
decreases and thus implies that before elections in the German states, the growth rate of the
job-creation schemes increased by about 0.3 percent.
Table 4 and 5 about here
We tested further specifications including the different election-year variables and cod-
ings described above and results did not change. Table 4 reports the regression results when
a post-election(12) variable is included. This variable takes on the value of one in the twelve
months after an election and is zero otherwise. In line with our theoretical predictions,
the post-election variable is statistically insignificant across the specifications while the elec-
tion(12) variable remains statistically significant and the numerical impact does not change.
Table 5 shows the regression results when the election variable takes on the value one in
the ten, eight, six or four months before the election (and zero otherwise). The results sug-
gest that incumbents did not increase job-creation schemes directly before elections as the
election(6) and election(4) variable turn to be statistically insignificant. This finding is also
in line with theoretical and intuitive predictions of political opportunism because it simply
takes some time to implement these job-creation schemes and opportunistic politicians would
not implement these measures if they could not get re-elected due to their activities.
Moreover, we checked for the sensitivity of the results to individual states. To rule out
this possibility, we performed the regressions again, excluding one state at a time. Overall,
the inferences are robust in that they are not subject to the inclusion of particular countries.
However, the impact of the election variables declines when Schleswig-Holstein and the
Saarland are excluded, yet remains significant on the 5 percent level.
In addition, we aggregated our monthly to yearly data and run the regressions with annual
data. These regression results perfectly correspond with our inferences using monthly data:
We find evidence for electoral cycles, whereas the partisan variables have the expected signs
but remain statistically insignificant.
4 Conclusion
We develop a model in which politicians are motivated both by partisan and opportunistic
goals. Following the recent literature on voting behavior, we assume that voters do not have
incentives for actively gathering information as they realize their low probability of being
decisive within the voting process. Electoral outcome is a random variable which depends
on two components. First, it depends on the current unemployment rate, as the respective
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literature claims voters to be sociotropic. As opinion polls reveal that unemployment is the
most - or at least one of the most - important political topics in nearly all industrialized
countries, we use unemployment as the sociotropic factor in our model. Second, electoral
outcome depends on a factor which can be interpreted as a voter bias, according to Caplan
and Cowen (2004) as well as the expressive voting hypothesis established by Brennan and
Lomasky (1993).
We find that politically motivated cycles, with respect to budget deficits and unemploy-
ment, do occur. Before an election takes place, politicians have the incentive to lower the
unemployment rates by using active labor market policy measures. After the election, the
(new) incumbent enforces the kind of ALMP that maximizes his utility. Post election cycles
in both variables occur due to partisan differences between politicians.
Our model is tested empirically using data from 1985:1 to 2004:11 for the ten former
West German states. The results show that there is, on the one hand, a pre-election effect
meaning that the number of job-creation schemes increases in election years. On the other
hand, we find no support for the hypothesis that leftist governments expand job-creation
measures in comparison to rightwing ones.
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5 Appendix
Figure 1: Public expenditure for Active and Passive Labor Market Policies as a percentage
of GDP (2005). Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2007
17
Figure 2: Number of Job-Creation Schemes in the West German States in the Period from
1984:12 to 2004:11. Source: German Federal Employment Office
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Figure 3: Number of Unemployed Persons in the West German States in the Period from
1984:12 to 2004:11. Source: German Federal Employment Office
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Job Creation Schemes 2390 6326.23 6440.11 172 30711 Federal Employment Agency
Unemployed Persons 2390 231364.50 211696.90 33679 921330 Federal Employment Agency
Election (12) 2390 0.24 0.43 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
Left 2231 0.62 0.49 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
SPD 2390 0.34 0.47 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
SPD/FDP 2390 0.11 0.31 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
SPD/GR 2390 0.13 0.34 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
CDU/SPD 2390 0.07 0.25 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
CDU/FDP 2390 0.15 0.36 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
CDU 2390 0.20 0.40 0 1 Potrafke (2006)
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***
(2.89) (3.04) (2.92) (3.06)
Left 0.0012 3x10−5
(0.62) (0.03)
SPD/FDP 0.0008 0.0008
(0.27) (0.40)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0030 0.0023
(1.63) (1.40)
CDU/SPD 0.0042 0.0033
(1.43) (1.40)
CDU/FDP 4x10−5 -0.0001
(0.02) (0.07)
CDU 0.0001 0.0010
(0.03) (0.63)
Constant -0.0062 -0.0052 -0.0057 -0.0055
(1.59) (1.38) (1.52) (1.55)
Fixed Country Effects Yes Yes No No
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2380 2221 2380
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Regression Results.Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job-creation
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen), 1985:1-2004:11. Heteroskedastic and autocorre-
lation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0025*** 0.0026***
(2.89) (3.13) (2.03) (2.13)
Left 0.0020 0.0014
(1.17) (0.82)
SPD/FDP 0.0011 0.0004
(0.43) (0.14)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0022 0.0016
(1.26) (0.91)
CDU/SPD 0.0028 0.0021
(1.04) (0.78)
CDU/FDP -0.0010 -0.0006
(0.54) (0.31)
CDU -0.0010 -0.0009
(0.37) (0.36)
Lags Dependent Variable Lag 1.-12. Lag 1.-12.
Lags Unemployed Persons Lag 1.-12. Lag 1.-12.
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3949*** 0.3968***
(9.92) (9.82)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t− 4) 0.0430* 0.0426*
(1.84) (1.80)
Constant -0.0435** -0.0476** -0.0084*** -0.0077**
(2.15) (2.39) (2.68) (2.35)
Fixed Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2120 2279 2200 2359
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.33
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job-creation
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen), 1985:1-2004:11. Heteroskedastic and autocorre-
lation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. Lags included.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0045*** 0.0043*** 0.0029** 0.0027**
(3.07) (3.02) (2.20) (2.14)
Post-Election (12) 0.0016 0.0007 0.0011 0.0005
(1.27) (0.54) (0.96) (0.43)
Left 0.0013 0.0015
(0.68) (0.87)
SPD/FDP 0.0008 0.0004
(0.26) (0.13)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0030 0.0016
(1.63) (0.92)
CDU/SPD 0.0041 0.0020
(1.40) (0.75)
CDU/FDP 3x10−5 -0.0006
(0.01) (0.34)
CDU 0.0001 -0.0009
(0.02) (0.37)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3944*** 0.3967***
(9.91) (9.81)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t− 4) 0.0434* 0.0428*
(1.85) (1.80)
Constant -0.0065* -0.0053 -0.0087*** -0.0078**
(1.67) (1.40) (2.76) (2.35)
Fixed Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2380 2200 2359
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.33
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Regression Results. Robustness Check with Post-Election (12). Dependent Vari-
able: Growth rate of the number of job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen),
1985:1-2004:11. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type
standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0025**
(2.03)
Election (10) 0.0027**
(2.29)
Election (8) 0.0027**
(2.18)
Election (6) 0.0020
(1.41)
Election (4) 0.0023
(1.62)
Left 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013
(0.82) (0.81) (0.80) (0.79) (0.79)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3949*** 0.3951*** 0.3952*** 0.3960*** 0.3962***
(9.92) (9.87) (9.87) (9.88) (9.90)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t-4) 0.0430* 0.0429* 0.0428* 0.0429* 0.0430*
(1.84) (1.85) (1.84) (1.85) (1.85)
Constant -0.0084*** -0.0083*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0082***
(2.68) (2.68) (2.63) (2.63) (2.63)
Fixed Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200
Number of N 10 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Regression Results. Different Codings of the Election Variable. Dependent Variable:
Growth rate of the number of job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen), 1985:1-
2004:11. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard
errors.
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5.1 Panel unit root tests
In order to test the stationarity of the time series, we applied the following panel unit root
tests by: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and the Fisher tests with
reference to Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). Breitung and Pesaran (2008) provide
a detailed description of the recent panel unit root tests. The results were obtained using
Eviews 6.0. In comparison to STATA 9.1, Eviews 6.0 allows the application of the respective
tests on unbalanced panels, it considers an automatic lag length selection through the use
of Information Criteria and also contains the Breitung (2000) test. Regarding the first three
tests, maximum lag lengths are automatically selected based on the Schwarz Information
Criterion. The remaining two tests use the Bartlett kernel for the Newey-West bandwidth
selection. The probabilities for the Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
The test results indicate that the growth rates of the job-creation schemes and the number
of unemployed persons are stationary.
Test statistics available upon request.
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